This article explores whether and under what conditions functional sectoral cooperation between the EU and the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy promotes democratic governance. In an analysis of four countries (Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine) and three fields of cooperation (competition, environment and migration policy), we show that country properties such as the degree of political liberalization, membership aspirations, and geographic region do not explain differences in democratic governance. Rather, sectoral conditions such as the codification of democratic governance rules, the institutionalization of functional cooperation, interdependence, and adoption costs matter most for the success of democratic governance promotion. We further reveal a notable discrepancy between adoption and application of democratic governance in the selected ENP countries that has not been remedied in the first five years of the ENP.
Introduction
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a strategy for the progressive approximation of non-member states to the European Union's acquis communautaire through their association with the EU. 1 The fact that the relations to the neighbouring countries are based on the EU's system of rules and regulations opens new perspectives for the study of democracy promotion. Having been designed by and for democratic states, these rules often embody norms related to transparency, participation or accountability that cannot be taken for granted in (semi-) authoritarian states or countries in transition. 2 In this article we explore the governance model of democracy promotion outlined in the introduction to this Special Issue 3 and ask how far and under which conditions the EU is effective in transferring such embedded democratic governance norms to the ENP countries.
One of the main challenges facing the effectiveness of the ENP is posed by the strong heterogeneity of countries to which it applies. While the ENP was originally conceived for the Eastern neighbours of the EU, it was soon expanded to encompass the Southern neighbouring countries as well. The expediency of this decision has always been disputed. Some scholars maintain that the Council 'put[s] apples and pears (Eastern Europe and Southern non-Europe) in the same policy basket', with problematic consequences for implementation. 4 The ENP's Eastern and Southern dimensions are said to 'pull in different directions' because the policy unites countries with opposed membership opportunities under one framework. 5 Although the ENP has never offered a membership perspective, it has been acknowledged from the very beginning that the 'prospect of accession to the EU' is the main difference between the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. 6 The Eastern European countries, such as Moldova and Ukraine that have expressed a strong membership aspiration, and, despite the EU's understanding that the ENP should be an alternative to membership, see the ENP as a first step towards accession, and try to redefine it accordingly. 7 EU actors recognize the membership aspiration of Moldova and tacitly acknowledge the membership perspective for Ukraine. 8 Thus, although there is no direct membership incentive, we may expect the EU to possess a certain 'leverage' 9 towards the Eastern European countries, inciting them to engage in political reforms in order to gain an officially favourable long-term accession perspective. 10 The situation is completely different for the Southern neighbours, which do not aspire for membership and for which the ENP does not offer strong incentives for implementation of the agreed commitments. 11 Thus, the prospects of policy change are expected to be much smaller for the Southern neighbours than for the Eastern.
This should in particular be the case with regard to governance reforms that transcend the level of pure technical convergence to EU standards. Here, a clear dividing line can be expected between transfer of democratic governance in the East and in the South.
From a governance perspective to democracy promotion, not only the choice of target countries but also the composition of policy sectors covered by the ENP exacerbates its heterogeneity. As a 'composite policy' 12 , the ENP combines overarching foreign policy goals with functional, sectoral cooperation across the spectrum of the EU's acquis communautaire, from commercial to environmental or migration policy. While we expect this acquis to generally incorporate certain democratic governance norms, their concrete manifestation varies from one policy sector to another, as do the institutional modes of cooperation between the EU and the ENP countries in the various sectors. 13 This variation as well as diverging patterns of interdependence and cost/benefit constellations related to the different policy sectors are, like the country-specific variables mentioned above, expected to impact on the effectiveness of EU rule transfer.
In this article we assess the relevance of country-and sector-related variables for the effectiveness of EU democratic governance promotion in relation to four countries (Moldova and Ukraine to the East, Jordan and Morocco to the South) and in three policy sectors (competition: state aid, environmental: water governance and migration policy: asylum). The analysis is primarily based on 199 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2007-9 with governmental and non-governmental actors in the four countries and with Commission officials and complemented by information drawn from the relevant official documents and reports.
The analysis shows that the general country-specific factors (region, membership aspirations, and political liberalization) do not explain variation in the adoption of democratic governance rules. Rather, democratic governance promotion follows a sectoral logic. In the issue-areas we studied, diverse combinations of favourable sector properties (codification of democratic governance, institutionalized functional cooperation, interdependence with the EU, and low adoption costs) led the ENP countries to adopt democratic governance rules. The application of these rules, however, has so far been weak. Whereas our study demonstrates that the promotion of democratic governance does indeed work independently of general political conditions and relations, its effectiveness is limited.
Democratic governance
In contrast to the traditional understanding of democratization that focuses on changes in state institutions, the governance approach concentrates on changes in governance rules and practices within individual policy sectors. We define our dependent variable as the transfer of democratic governance rules measured at the level of policy sectors, and distinguish between formal rule adoption in domestic legislation and rule application in administrative practices. According to the governance model, changes in both rule adoption and application occur as a consequence of third countries' approximation to the EU acquis as well as experience of democratic policymaking gained by policymakers and experts in the ENP states in interaction with their counterparts in the EU. 14 We speak of democratic governance rather than democracy in order to capture democratization at the sectoral level and distinguish it from democratic developments at the polity level. Our notion of democratic governance is based on an understanding of democracy defined according to its underlying principles rather than specific institutions embodying them. Since democratic principles are applicable to all situations in which collectively binding decisions are taken, 15 they can be translated into sectoral policymaking. Democratic sectoral governance may thus be achieved by incorporating democratic principles into administrative rules and practices even within a non-democratic polity. We define sectoral governance with reference to 'how the rules of the political game are managed'. 16 In this sense, democratic governance is similar to good governance. 17 The latter, however, refers mainly to the effectiveness of governance and need not be democratic.
Our concept of democratic governance consists of three dimensions: transparency, accountability and participation. 18 Transparency refers both to access to issue-specific data and to governmental provision of information about decision making. Accountability concerns public officials' obligation to justify their decisions and actions, the possibility of appeal and sanctioning over misconduct. We distinguish between horizontal accountability that refers to 'all acts of accountability that take place between independent state agencies' 19 such as investigating committees, ombudsmen and anticorruption bodies, and vertical accountability that emphasizes the obligation for public officials to justify their decisions. Finally, participation denotes non-electoral forms of participation such as involvement of non-state actors in administrative decision-and policymaking. 20 These democratic principles are incorporated -but not 'labelled overtly as democracy-focused' 21 -in EU sectoral acquis and policy programs towards the neighbouring states. They may take different forms in different sectors.
It should be noted that an increase in democratic governance cannot be a real substitute for democratic transformation proper and that rules pertaining e.g. to transparency provisions in environmental legislation or to independent judicial review in asylum policy are only small drops in the ocean of institutional provisions constituting a democratic order. What is more, some of these provisions may, as with asylum policy, represent low minimum standards from the perspective of liberal democracies. Nevertheless, implementation even of minimum standards regarding citizens' access to information, participation in administrative processes or the accountability of administrative decisions 'requires a process of transformation in those countries where such traditions are lacking' 22 , and may constitute one step within a broader democratization of state and society.
Determinants of democratic governance transfer
The governance model suggests that the transfer of democratic governance provisions to ENP countries will be influenced by both country-specific properties and sectorrelated variables. The following sections discuss the two sets of explanatory factors in detail. Table 1 summarizes country and sectoral properties.
Impact of country properties
We identify two main country properties that may have an impact on democratic governance transfer: membership aspiration and political liberalization. Studies have shown that a certain degree of prior political liberalization is needed in order to effectively foster domestic democratization processes. 23 For instance, the existence of an active civil society and decentralized decision-making structures is required so that sub-governmental administration officers implement the provisions on participation as one of the aspects of democratic governance. In relation to democratic governance, a minimal degree of political liberalization may serve as a precondition for establishing horizontal transgovernmental ties of functional cooperation between public officials in an ENP state and their EU counterparts.
Incentives offered by the EU to the ENP countries range from enhanced cooperation on economic issues, including a stake in the internal market, to sectoral enticements, such as favourable visa regimes. In this, the ENP largely resembles the enlargement strategy. 24 Although the ENP lacks the biggest incentive the EU can offer, a membership perspective, several ENP states aspire joining the EU nevertheless. Such membership aspiration might have an impact on rule adoption because of the perceived low credibility of the EU's refusal to open accession negotiations. Some ENP countries are 'not taking no for an answer' and therefore 'may go ahead with adoption of EU standards'. 25 We hypothesize that the effectiveness of democratic governance transfer increases (H1) the more the ENP state strives for EU membership irrespective of actual offer, and (H2) the higher degree of political liberalization of this state is.
Impact of sectoral properties
The governance model of external democracy promotion follows an institutionalist perspective, according to which the properties of cooperation in sectors have an impact on rule transfer. We identify four sectoral properties as relevant for democratic governance promotion: codification of democratic governance provisions, costs associated with the adoption of democratic governance rules for country elites, institutionalization of transgovernmental cooperation in a particular sector, and sectoral interdependence.
Codification is about the incorporation of democratic governance provisions in the EU acquis and/or international conventions and rule determinacy. The expected impact of this variable is based on the observation that 'the way in which EU rules are communicated and transferred to the non-member states' 26 influences the likelihood of being adopted by them. We expect that adoption is more likely, if (i) democratic-governance provisions are perceived as being legitimate by virtue of incorporation in both EU acquis and international conventions 27 , and (ii) they are clear and precise enough to qualify as templates without considerable adaptation to the context of third countries. 28 High sectoral adoption costs occur if adoption of democratic governance provisions is expected to diminish the government's domestic power base. 29 Medium adoption costs occur when the power base of sectoral authorities is diminished but the central government is not directly affected.
Institutionalization concerns formalized transgovernmental policy cooperation between the EU and ENP states. We expect that the more institutionalized sectorspecific policy cooperation with the EU is, the more likely third countries are to adopt EU democratic governance provisions. Enhanced transgovernmental cooperation exposes sectoral officials to the practices of democratic governance, thus facilitating rule adoption. In weakly institutionalized sectors, only regional frameworks of cooperation without EU engagement exist. Medium institutionalization characterizes bilateral channels of policy cooperation with the EU. Strongly institutionalized sectors enjoy formalized transgovernmental cooperation in both bilateral and EU-controlled regional fora.
Finally, interdependence refers to a cooperating party's conviction that sectorspecific problems can be solved in collaboration with the EU rather than domestically or in collaboration with other external parties. 30 As a form of external governance, the ENP can be understood as the EU's strategy of managing interdependence with its neighbouring countries. Following the power-based explanation of external governance, we expect that EU democratic governance promotion through the ENP is more likely to have an impact when EU-third country relations are asymmetric in favour of the EU. 31 At the same time, the impact of democratic governance promotion is constrained when the target country is facing strong interdependence with another third country. 32 We adopt the concept of sectoral interdependence from Keohane and Nye who argue that 'patterns of outcomes and distinctive political processes are likely to vary from one set of issues to another'. 33 We hypothesize that (H3) the stronger codification is and (H4) the more an ENP state is involved in transgovernmental networks, the higher the likelihood of successful rule transfer is. The positive impact of cooperation in transgovernmental networks, however, may be offset by other sector-specific factors. The relevant hypotheses are: (H5) the higher the expected adoption costs of the third country are and (H6) the less sectoral interdependence favours the EU, the less likely EU rule transfer is. Rule adoption has marginal consequences for the power of the government and the sectoral authorities Institutionalization strong Existence of both bilateral and EU-controlled regional fora dealing with the relevant rules medium Only EU-third-country bilateral fora dealing with the relevant rules weak
Only third countries' fora, not controlled by the EU Interdependence strong ENP state perceives to be more or equally dependent on the EU in solving its sectoral problems medium ENP state perceives to be less dependent on the EU than vice versa, or more dependent on other external actors than the EU in solving its sectoral problems weak
No reliance on the EU in solving sectoral problems
Democratic governance promotion in the neighbourhood
The remainder of the article presents the results of our empirical analysis of functional cooperation between the EU and four ENP countries in three policy sectors. We start with the impact of country properties on rule adoption and substantiate the selection of countries chosen for the case studies. We then turn to the sectoral perspective and introduce our choice of policy sectors. The hypotheses regarding the impact of sectoral variables on democratic-governance promotion are discussed for each sector.
Next follows the presentation of our findings on rule adoption and application in the selected countries and policy sectors. We conclude with a comparative analysis of the impact of country-and sector-related characteristics on democratic governance promotion in the EU neighbourhood.
Country-specific factors in the EU neighbourhood
For our empirical study, we selected four ENP countries, two from the Eastern As regards membership aspiration, there is, again, a clear difference between the Eastern and Southern neighbours. Whereas the former seek to join the EU eventually, the latter are not pursuing the strategy of integration with the EU.
Moldova and Ukraine, as Eastern European countries, are in geographical terms eligible for EU membership. Despite the fact that the EU has so far failed to offer such a perspective, both countries aspire to join the EU. 36 Moldova set up a National Based on our hypotheses H1 and H2, we expect that Moldova and Ukraine will be more likely to adopt democratic governance provisions than Jordan and Morocco, since they enjoy higher degree of political liberalization and aspire to EU membership. If in our empirical analysis we do not find supportive evidence for these hypotheses, the relevance of country-specific explanatory factors will be challenged.
Sector-specific factors in the EU neighbourhood
The selection of the three sectors -environment, competition and migration -was guided by the strength of codified democratic-governance provisions. Interdependence is medium in the EU's asylum cooperation with Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine. Moldova is a transit country for migration flows into the EU, which makes the EU interested in establishing an adequate asylum system in Moldova. However, large-scale labour migration of Moldovan citizens to the EU endangers the country's socio-economic development. Therefore, Moldova is willing to make concessions to the EU on these issues. 42 Likewise in Ukraine, another transit country: limited capacity of the Ukrainian Migration Services to handle asylum issues 43 makes them dependent on external support. Morocco is currently a transit country for incoming migration flows in the EU. The number of asylum seekers in Morocco itself is, however, likely to increase due to more adequate protection and more restrictive EU regulations. Interdependence is therefore considered medium.
Jordan and the EU do not depend on each other in solving asylum-related issues.
Sectoral adoption costs for the asylum policy are medium in all four countries.
In Moldova, asylum policy is structurally and politically under-prioritized due to perceived non-importance, compared to problems caused by outward migration, such as trafficking in human beings. Furthermore, there is reluctance of police-trained policy officers to implement a human-rights-oriented approach to asylum, largely resting on democratic governance provisions. In Ukraine, granting asylum to refugees and taking back irregular migrants might be more unpopular than costly because foreigners are often seen as being the root of problems such as violence and illnesses. 44 Furthermore, the establishment of a central agency dealing with asylum and migration issues that would make procedures more transparent and enhance accountability has been delayed for many years among others because of several Based on our hypotheses H3 and H4, we expect higher values of codification and institutionalization to be associated with a higher likelihood of successful rule transfer. In line with H5 and H6 we further expect that the positive impact of cooperation in transgovernmental networks might be impaired by high adoption costs
and weak sectoral interdependence.
Democratic governance in the EU neighbourhood
Eastern neighbourhood I: Moldova. In all three sectors Moldova has reached a medium level of rule adoption. Moreover, prepared legislation will, if adopted. significantly strengthen democratic governance provisions, thus targeting high degree of rule adoption in the future. Relatively successful rule adoption is, however, not matched by rule application that remains weak.
In the field of competition, the Law on the Protection of Competition 1103-XIV of 2000 set out a general framework and established a legal basis for an independent competition authority, the National Agency for the Protection of Competition (NAPC). The law, however, did not enter into force until 2007. 47 Progress in the implementation of the law and the inception of the NAPC was triggered by the EU. 48 explicitly states that the law is to bring domestic legislation on asylum in line with internationally recognized standards. The ENP Action Plan encourages further efforts in this direction (Art. 46). Already the first ENP progress report acknowledged substantial progress. 53 The recent amendments to the law established the main principles of a human rights approach to refugees and asylum seekers, exhaustively covering the application of the principles of transparency, accountability and participation, such as fair consideration of applications for asylum, provision of exhaustive information about procedures, possibilities for appeal and contacting the UNHCR representative. Yet, the implementation of legislation commended by the EU is a major problem. The main concern is the non-application of the human-rights approach by the Moldovan migration and border control authorities. 58 The result of reforms in the sphere of environmental and in particular water governance can be described as mixed. On the one hand, there are some positive judgments regarding progress in public involvement and access to environmental information. 59 which is currently under preparation, would transform it into an 'independent'
Commission, i.e. the judicial procedure would no longer be mediated by the minister.
However, the 2004 law grants any legal person the right to directly address the court (Art. 17A). It further states that the Directorate must publish an announcement regarding any petition, though at the expense of the applicant, and the decision in two daily newspapers (transparency; Art. 10D, 11B). This announcement 'shall' include an invitation to any interested party to present its opinion (participation). The competition law, however, does not present any progress in the specific issue of state aid. 66 Implementation of the 2004 law's provisions suffers mainly from the lack of independence of the body tasked with administration, the lack of adequate knowledge among lawyers, judges and prosecutors, and the power of big companies that dictate their own terms. 67 Only few cases were referred to the courts by the Directorate since 2004 but no decisions were hitherto taken (accountability). 68 There is strong opposition among the ruling elite to establish the Directorate as a separate autonomous commission. As to state aid, the data collected under the budget law continue to fall short of international standards in terms of transparency, disclosure and comprehensiveness. 69 Although a number of environmental laws exist and water issues are salient in water-scarce Jordan, preparation of legislation on water per se started with the new water strategy officially endorsed in 2009. Primary legislation is hitherto a by-law issued under the 1995 Environment Protection Law (and its amendments 2003 and 2006), which does not contain any governance provisions. Still, some improvements of access to information and participation can be observed. 70 For instance, the water strategy states that the 'development of appropriate legislation will require regular and systematic consultation with a diversity of stakeholders and water users' 71 . Until now no (independent) authority exists that supervises water management (accountability).
Generally, many by-laws implementing the adopted laws are missing and informal networks based on family ties jeopardize rules on sound water management.
Responsibilities overlap between water institutions and procedures of accountability do not exist. A top-down approach is applied: stakeholders are normally not involved in decision-making (participation) and the right to information is confused with education and awareness campaigns. 72 The horizontal 2008 access to information law is too restrictive to be effective. 73 Due to its exposure to consistent migratory waves since the outset of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 74 backing, which makes it a less reliant authority. 77 In order to introduce true participation, the revised competition law elaborated as part of a Twinning project foresees that Council and government need to consult interested parties before taking decisions. The revised law also improved provisions on transparency. The competition law is only partially implemented. The Competition Council has been activated in January 2009, but it is still far away from being an independent authority with decision competencies. Progress in transparency is limited to provision of information on the total amount and the distribution of aid in form of annual reports to the Commission. 78 The revised law leaves publication of decisions at the authority's discretion, but grants access to the records. As for participation, even the General (2-57-1256) . However, it is not enforced due to the disregard of the legal supremacy of international law. 85 The 2003 Morocco. Importantly, it also introduces a few articles on refugees and asylum seekers that follow democratic norms and that have been incorporated as response to EU demands. 86 In case of refusal of asylum application it obliges the authorities to explain their decision (accountability) and inform asylum seekers of their rights (transparency), provide access a lawyer and allow contesting the decision before an administrative court. However, it does not specify participation of other relevant actors. Furthermore, the law considerably strengthens the administration's discretionary use of power. 87 The application of the 2003 Law is problematic since without implementing decrees it did not fully enter into force. Further, Morocco has no national centre for temporary accommodation of illegal migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. To compensate for this, the Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH) opened the Reception and Legal Centre for Refugees. Its effect remains marginal, however, because lawyers and judges are not familiar with international standards and deportations proceed too fast for any juridical procedure to take place.
Determinants and success of democratic governance transfer: Comparative analysis
The most striking general finding of our analysis is the ambiguous impact of EU democratic governance promotion (see Table 3 Regarding sector-specific factors, Table 3 shows that the transfer of democratic- By contrast, hypotheses H3 to H6 find general support for the proposition that sectoral properties affect democratic governance rule adoption. Our analysis generally demonstrates that democratic governance transfer is the more successful, the more strongly its provisions are codified in the sectoral acquis, the more institutionalized cooperation between the EU and ENP states is, the more interdependent the parties are, and, finally, the lower adoption costs are for national governments and sectoral authorities. Whenever all four sectoral conditions are at least moderately favourable (medium or high values), which happens to be the case in seven out of our 12 cases, legislation stipulating democratic governance is either adopted or under way. By contrast, none of the sectoral conditions is individually sufficient or necessary (see tTable in the Appendix).
Conclusions
This article explores the democratizing potential of transgovernmental sectoral cooperation between the EU and four of its neighbours to the East and South. We argue that the governance model of external democracy promotion, which foresees the transfer of democratic rules and principles as part of policy-problem solutions, is an indirect strategy of fostering democratization in such countries, which resist direct democracy promotion efforts from the outside. We compare democratic governance rule transfer between two countries in the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU (Moldova and Ukraine) and a pair of states in the Southern neighbourhood (Jordan and Morocco) and explore country-and sector-related factors that are likely to facilitate or obstruct successful promotion of democratic governance.
Contrary to the East-South divide argument, we find similar patterns of rule adoption and rule application in all four countries. Both in the East and in the South, we detect a clear discrepancy between rule adoption and rule application: Whereas the EU has been fairly successful in inducing the four ENP countries to adopt legislation in line with democratic governance provisions, these provisions have -at least so far -generally not been implemented.
These commonalities between the Eastern and the Southern neighbours undermine the theoretical expectation about the influence of country characteristics on democratic governance transfer. By contrast, the influence of sector-specific properties is generally supported by the evidence. The absence of high adoption costs, and at least moderate interdependence, codification, and institutionalization could be associated with actual or potential rule adoption. To predict rule adoption with high confidence, however, all conditions had to be jointly at least moderately favourable.
Can we generalize our results to the rest of the ENP countries? Although low liberalization and the absence of membership aspiration do not seem to present an obstacle to the transfer of acquis-based democratic governance elements, the importance of country-related factors cannot be completely ruled out. First, the selected countries comprised the politically most liberal countries in the respective regions at the time of research. While the difference in political liberalization did not matter for this sample, even weaker liberalization in the other ENP countries may well undermine far-reaching cooperation. Furthermore, changes in government, such as those recently experienced in Moldova and Ukraine, may yield not only retrogressions in levels of political liberalization but also a turn away from an EU focus and, despite the relative autonomy of sectoral cooperation dynamics, also declining levels of approximation to EU rules. Second, the comparatively less successful rule transfer in the case of Jordan appears to demonstrate the significance of proximity: Jordan's geographic position leads to less interdependence with the EU and a less exclusive focus on the EU as a cooperation partner than in the closer neighbours Liberalization and proximity can be expected to shape the degree of cooperation in general. On the basis of our findings, it can however be reasoned that if cooperation is agreed, the extent to which it influences the likelihood of successful promotion of democratic governance depends again on sectoral properties.
In sum, we maintain that the governance model has some potential forencouraging democratic developments in countries where more direct forms of external democracy promotion fail. The analysis clearly shows that democratic governance promotion is a separate model of democracy promotion that functions to some extent independently of general political conditions in the EU's neighbouring countries.
But were the EU to succeed in prompting democratic governance in its neighbouring states, would democratic governance trigger democratization at the polity level? The relationship between democratic governance and democracy is not necessarily bidirectional. On the one hand, empirical studies confirm that democracy is positively associated with democratic governance. 88 First, strong democratic institutions have a constraining effect on corruption and discretionary power of government officials. Second, they ensure the functioning of free media that have a supervisory function over governmental action, thus improving democratic accountability and transparency of policymaking.
On the other hand, there is no conclusive evidence that strong democratic governance in policy sectors leads necessarily to democratization of political institutions. Three scenarios are possible. First, in a neutral 'de-coupling' scenario, legislation containing democratic governance rules may simply remain a dead letter. 89 Governments adopt these rules in order to increase their legitimacy with the EU and other organizations and reap the benefits of international cooperation but will not apply them in practice if they harm vested political, administrative, or economic interests or if implementation is costly. At best, such a strategy of democratic governance promotion might lead to hybrid regimes through 'grafting "modern" liberal forms of governance in certain spheres onto essentially authoritarian structures' 90 . This is the most probable short-term scenario emerging from our case studies. Second, in the negative scenario, external actors may even risk undermining the prospects for further democratic reforms, stabilizing non-democratic political systems and eventually creating the so-called enlightened dictatorships.
Finally, viewed from a more optimistic and long-term perspective, the adoption of the principles of transparency, accountability and participation in sectoral legislation may, if properly applied, be one step in the mobilization of a more vivid civil society and a stronger societal control of state power, both of which would constitute important preconditions for democracy proper. We therefore conclude that while democratic governance is unlikely to -by itself -engender systemic change, it nevertheless plays an important role in preparing the legal and bureaucratic basis upon which eventual transitions towards a new democratic order can draw.
